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O’Connor’s book is very clear, easy to follow, and
replete with excellent illustrations and analogies. Its
clarity is outdone only by its virtuous attempt at overall
fairness and sensitivity toward readers both religious and
not. An excellent undergraduate book for classroom use, it
is generally excellent in coverage of the issues as well as
thoughtful and original in its own contributions. Although
it is limited in its scope, covering the problem of evil,
and arguments for God’s existence from design, it is a good
book for general philosophy of religion courses, (if
supplemented with others) but very good for more advanced
undergraduate courses on the problem of evil or the design
argument.
The book’s content is clearly laid out, with helpful
summaries of the argument throughout. It is broken into six
parts and twelve chapters. “Part I: Introduction” contains
two chapters, one introducing the problems to be
investigated and a second discussing terminology. “Part II:
The Logic of God and Evil” has two chapters, covering the
issue of whether God’s existence is impossible (the Mackie
version of the logical problem of evil) and then

Plantinga’s freewill defense of the possibility of God’s
existence. “Part III: Design and Evil” has both chapters
consider natural order, natural selection and supernatural
design. “Part IV: Evil and Design (1)” covers first,
Draper’s and Rowe’s arguments on the improbability of God’s
existence given evil and second (in two more chapters)
skeptical defenses from Wykstra and Van Inwagen and a
evaluation of those defenses. “Part V: Evil and Design (2)”
explains greater-good defenses from Hick and Swinburne,
with a second chapter of evaluation. “Part VI: Taking
Stock” draws together the author’s considered opinion on
the overall argument.
The entire book is framed as an investigation into two
questions. First, does the idea of God mesh with the vast
amounts of suffering in the world? Second, when that
suffering is taken into account alongside the good things,
would it be reasonable to conclude that the world is best
explained by the existence of God? The starting point, and
a pedagogically useful tool, is the veil of ignorance
modeled on Rawls suggestion.

The veil of ignorance for the

first investigation is as follows: Imagine that we neither
believe nor disbelieve in God. We retain all our knowledge
of religion and other things. For the second investigation,
the veil includes not just that we neither believe nor

disbelieve in God but that we know nothing at all about
religion, not even about its existence. Nor do we know
anything about philosophy either. But we are rational,
lucid and as curious as ever. The veil of ignorance is
introduced, of course, to help generate as much objectivity
as possible in the course of the investigation.
There are several separately presented, but ultimately
connected, issues. The book considers the logical problem
of evil as classically described by Mackie, and argues,
following Platinga, that the case against God on strictly
logical grounds fails. God’s existence is not impossible,
given evil. What is particularly well done in this part of
the book is the explanations of what is at stake in
“logical” arguments dealing with possibility and
impossibility and what needs to be done to “make a case.”
O’Connor explains where the burden of proof lies and how
heavy (or light) that burden is when discussing what is
possible (or not).
Part III, chapter 5 includes sections on order and
evolution, evolution and creation, evaluating the rival
hypotheses. The hypothesis are a) this is the only universe
and both natural order and the initial conditions are due
to chance, b) this universe is one of many, those the
chances of natural order and the initial conditions coming

about are greater than if only one universe exists and c)
the universe exists by design, thus order and the initial
conditions were intentional. Chapter 6 includes sections on
simplicity, problems surrounding consciousness and
causation, conditions at the big bang, the design
hypothesis and the occurrence of terrible things, and
finally, the verdict. Here I quote: “The basic facts in the
investigation are the deep orderliness in the universe, the
occurrence at the Big Bang of the right conditions for life
to evolve, the mix of pleasure and pain experienced by some
living things, and the apparent pointlessness of much of
that pain…. [O]ur investigation indicates that the idea of
God would not come up as the overall best explanation.” (p.
107). O’Connor is careful to admit that the idea of a
personal cause might come up, but not the idea of God,
given the veil of ignorance.
Part IV, Chapter 7 includes sections on keeping the
problem in focus (making eight points about justified evils
to provide a comparative standard), Draper’s indirect
argument (which does not commit him to a naturalistic
theory of the origin of the universe), and Rowe’s direct
argument (which does so commit him). Chapter 8 presents Van
Inwagen’s Goldilocks problem in a section on how much of a
bad thing is too much, Wystra’s “noseeum” defense covering

unreasonable expectations for knowing how God works and
then Van Inwagen’s pre- and post-Garden of Eden defense.
Chapter nine evaluates the skeptical defenses noting a
serious side-effect of both Wykstra’s and Van Inwagen’s
defenses, viz. they seem to make the concept of God
virtually incomprehensible. Wykstra’s view has the
additional problem of undercutting the very concept of
theistic morality.
Part V, Chapter 10 compares Hick’s and Swinburne’s
overlapping but distinct positions in the first section.
This is followed by a brief consideration of libertarian
freewill and its affect on our understanding of God,
concluding that the defense works at a general level but
leaves us with many puzzles amongst the details. In a
section on natural disasters and the free-will defense,
O’Connor takes up the soul-making theodicy and animal
suffering. Chapter 11 includes sections on justified and
compensated suffering and also death and the afterlife,
along with a theistic variation on the hypothesis of
indifference, and finally a verdict on the greater-good
defense. The basic conclusion of the chapter is that we
find no good justification for the evils that occur and
that the introduction of an afterlife simply reraises the
issues there, both for humans and for animals, or it leaves

one wondering why God didn’t take humans and animals
straight to the better life instead of dragging us through
this one.
In the last chapter, O’Connor draws all his
conclusions together in a clear presentation and balances
them against individual religious experience. He concludes
that although religious experience may ground a believer’s
outlook, it is not evidence. We end up with a sort of
détente between those who have the a certain sort of
religious experience and those who do not.
As I said earlier, the book is a very good, clear
introduction to two central and interconnected issues,
design and evil, as they are related to the existence of
God. I would recommend the book for use in the classroom
for its clarity and fairness. But there are always some
negatives. Here are a few minor notes. I’ll return to some
larger issues below.
First, O’Connor suggests that “Hinduism has
monotheistic leanings. For its many Gods and Goddesses are
seen within that faith as ultimately offshoots of one great
God.” (p. 20) This oversimplifies Hinduism quite a bit and
could be misleading to students. For example, Advaita
Vendata Hinduism is atheistic completely. On p. 24 the
suggestion is made there is a problem in moving from our

own experience of personhood to the personhood of God, for
we have no experience of personhood separate from
embodiedness, the latter of which God doesn’t have. I’m not
sure of the relevance of O’Connor’s point, since before we
discovered our brains “did the thinking” we thought our
souls or spirits did. (I’ll pick this up below as well).
Also, O’Connor more or less identifies moral evils with sin
(p. 26). This is a substantial short changing of the
Christian notion of sin.

The notion of sin certainly

includes moral evils but much more as well, such as
relational issues toward God, ourselves, and nature.
Related to this issue is O’Connor’s handling of Plantinga’s
notion of original sin, which he says is stronger than the
Christian notion of sin. He bases this claim on a quotation
from Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. Seems like a fairly
weak source for understanding something as complex as the
“Christian” notion of original sin (which not even
Christians agree on). One final quibble, I’m wonder why the
book doesn’t deal with Plantinga’s way out of the
evidential problem of evil.
On to something larger than a quibble. First, on page
29 the author writes, speaking of God and evil: “There is
no philosophical problem about the latter without the
concept of the former.” I demur. Surely there is a problem

of evil even without God. When my late wife died, my then
eleven-year old son wondered about God’s existence. I
suggested to him that the world is full of evil and
badness. With God, the world is mysterious. Without God not
only is it mysterious but a lot more lonely. I think my
intuitions were right. O’Connor appears to disagree.

In

fact, it seems that evil is taken throughout the book as
something a naturalist will just accept as obvious and
(perhaps) to be expected in a universe without God. But
why? There is a complicated and not so obvious story to be
told by the naturalist about why we notice evil qua evil.
Stated from the positive side, naturalist have what is
sometimes called the “problem of the good.” Whence our
sense of right and wrong? Is it objectively based, in a
world sans God? If it is subjectively based only, then why
would the human subjective understanding of morality really
rule out God? Perhaps God has a different (even subjective)
account of evil? In the end, don’t the claims of the book
(recognizing that one author can only do so much in one
book) need to balanced by a cogent evaluation of
naturalism’s prospect of developing an objective moral
view? And doesn’t that need doing before a conclusion can
be reached on the subjects of the investigation?

A second substantial issue is to wonder about whether
objectivity (or even something close to it) is possible in
philosophy, even given a veil of ignorance. There are a
number of related subpoints here. First, it’s not clear to
me that O’Connor’s separation of evidence and grounds is
the best way to think of these matters. For example, many
philosophers of religion believe religious or theistic
experience provides not just psychological grounds but
evidential grounds for religious or theistic belief. The
so-called Reformed epistemology of Alvin Plantinga or
William Alston’s understanding of perceiving God fall into
this camp.
Be that as it may, let’s focus on psychology and how
it may play into rationality.

An interesting analogy is

found in the case of forgeries in the plastic arts. When a
forgery is discovered, even though the experts have viewed
and considered the fake as authentic before the discovery,
after the fact many experts are suddenly able to see many
features of the work of art itself in virtue of which it is
obviously fake. Prior to the discovery of the piece’s
inauthenticity, no one noticed these features. I wonder if
the difference between the religious believer who has
experienced God in her life is something like the art
expert who has shifted from viewing the art piece as

authentic to viewing it as inauthentic. Maybe after
conversion via religious experience, the believer simply
sees things to which the religiously neutral person is
blind. In short, I’d like to see some work done on the
psychology of religious belief and experience themselves
and how it plays into evaluating the presence of design or
evil in the world. Not that I expect that in this book, but
to take his approach, O’Connor and others who attempt such
“neutrality” need, perhaps, to reconsider the role of the
psychology of belief on what we can perceive or take in as
believers.
But the problems with the veil of ignorance have to do
with more than my last point.

Let me illustrate a

particular place in the book where I think the veil of
ignorance may get a little out of hand. O’Connor writes:
What is the substance of this conjectured entity? Of
what stuff is it made? Considering the stipulation
that the basic laws of nature cannot apply to it,
because it is represented as having no physical
properties at all, what positive characterization is
to be given of it?
Behind the veil of ignorance, what resources are
available for an answer? Perhaps an answer can be
found in terms of felt consciousness, that is, in

terms of how being conscious feels to us. Our
awareness of pains and feelings and so on is not
awareness of brain processes or any physical processes
or states as such. In addition to pains and feelings,
felt consciousness includes the experience of having
intentions, making choices, and so on.
But there is strong reason to think such an
account of the substance or nature of the alleged nonphysical designer would not do. For, while felt
consciousness does not present to us the physical base
of our awareness as such, the fact is that we have no
acquaintance whatever with conscious beings not having
such a base. Every conscious being we know of has a
body. And there is no reason to suppose that fact is
just a coincidence. Instead, there is good reason to
think that a physical base is a necessary condition of
consciousness in the first place. Both our common
experience and the scientific literacy we retain
behind the veil of ignorance strongly support the
point. (p. 93)
Here standing behind the veil of ignorance seems to do a
disservice to the project. If we are ignorant of religion
but not of science, aren’t we begging the question against
the infinite vs. the finite person? While it is true that

we know of no finite person for whom felt consciousness
exits without a physical base, why think this would apply
to something that perhaps only religious thought would give
us, viz. an infinite person? Could it be that the veil of
ignorance is not so much a veil as simply an
(unintentional) ignoring of data that might be useful?
Parallel to that set of issues is a question about a
particular claim of O’Connor’s on p. 7 where he writes:
“Our examination here is of philosophical questions only.
Purely religious questions will receive no further
discussion.” Well, I know this is common move in philosophy
of religion texts, but isn’t it sort of like saying “Let’s
discuss morality, but make no assumptions about human
nature”?
Most of these quibbles and even the more substantive
issues make for good classroom discussion. In some sense,
then, they add to the value of the book.

Like all good

philosophy, there are toeholds toward a better
understanding to be found in this work.

So, my questions

aside, the book is a fine one, and very good for classroom
use. It is generally even-handed and fair and where it may
not be, it is not obviously intentionally ignoring issues.
It is very clear and has helpful illustrations. I would not

hesitate to use it in my own class room and recommend it to
others.

